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It is shown that the randomness of the firing times of neurons in decision-making
attractor neuronal networks that is present before the decision cues are applied can
cause statistical fluctuations that influence the decision that will be taken. In this rigorous
sense, it is possible to partially predict decisions before they are made. This raises issues
about free will and determinism. There are many decision-making networks in the brain.
Some decision systems operate to choose between gene-specified rewards such as taste,
touch, and beauty (in for example the peacock’s tail). Other processes capable of planning
ahead with multiple steps held in working memory may require correction by higher
order thoughts that may involve explicit, conscious, processing. The explicit system can
allow the gene-specified rewards not to be selected or deferred. The decisions between
the selfish gene-specified rewards, and the explicitly calculated rewards that are in the
interests of the individual, the phenotype, may themselves be influenced by noise in
the brain. When the explicit planning system does take the decision, it can report on its
decision-making, and can provide a causal account rather than a confabulation about the
decision process. We might use the terms “willed action” and “free will” to refer to the
operation of the planning system that can think ahead over several steps held in working
memory with which it can take explicit decisions. Reduced connectivity in some of the
default mode cortical regions including the precuneus that are active during self-initiated
action appears to be related to the reduction in the sense of self and agency, of causing
willed actions, that can be present in schizophrenia.
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INTRODUCTION
In this paper, I consider the operation of the different decision-
making systems in the brain, and how these are involved in willed
action. I also consider the sense of agency which is disturbed in
schizophrenia.
PREDICTION OF DECISIONS FROM NEURAL ACTIVITY
Can decisions be predicted from brain activity? When willed
actions are self-initiated, it is frequently difficult in neuroimag-
ing studies to determine whether the decision can be pre-
dicted from the neural activity, because it is not easy to estab-
lish when the decision has been taken. Further, as I consider
below, the decision may be taken by brain systems to which
we do not have conscious access, and about which we cannot
make a verbal report, and this further complicates the answer.
In this section, I consider fMRI studies that do aim to pre-
dict decisions from brain activity, and then show that in a
system that can be studied rigorously, it is possible to pre-
dict a decision that will be taken from the noisy (stochastic)
fluctuations of neuronal activity in a decision-making network
mechanism.
There are fMRI analyses of how early one can predict from
neural activity what decision will be taken (Haynes and Rees,
2005a,b, 2006; Pessoa and Padmala, 2005; Lau et al., 2006;
Hampton and O’Doherty, 2007; Haynes et al., 2007; Rolls et al.,
2009). For example, in one investigation subjects held in mind
which of two tasks, addition or subtraction, they intended to per-
form. It was possible, while they held it in mind in a delay period,
to decode or predict with fMRI (functional magnetic resonance
neuroimaging) frommedial prefrontal cortex activations whether
addition or subtraction would later be performed, with accuracies
in the order of 70% (where chance was 50%) (Haynes et al., 2007).
There is also evidence that the ongoing variations in neural activ-
ity measured for example with fMRI may be related to whether
a signal is detected and to perceptual decisions (Ress et al., 2000;
Boly et al., 2007; Hesselmann et al., 2008, 2010; Sadaghiani et al.,
2010).
A problem with such studies is that it is often not possible to
know exactly when the decision was taken at the mental level, or
when preparation for the decision actually started, so it is diffi-
cult to know whether neural activity that precedes an action or
report in any way predicts the actual decision that will be taken
(Rolls and Deco, 2010). In fMRI studies, the temporal precision is
also poor. In these circumstances, is there anything rigorous that
our understanding of the neurodynamic mechanisms involved in
the decision-making can provide? It turns out that there is, as I
show here using an integrate-and-fire attractor network model of
decision-making.
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We simulated (Rolls and Deco, 2011) an integrate-and-fire
attractor network model of decision-making (Wang, 2002; Rolls
and Deco, 2010; Deco et al., 2012) with two possible decision
states, D1 and D2 (Figure 1). After 2 s of spontaneous fir-
ing, decision cues for D1 and D2 were applied to the network.
The decision cues for these simulations had equal magnitude,
and each decision state was chosen on approximately 50% of
the trials, which is the chance performance that was expected.
We, however, looked backwards in time to the period before
the decision cues were applied, to investigate whether the
noisy firing (i.e., variable because each neuron emitted close
to Poisson spike trains) before the decision cues were applied
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Attractor or autoassociation single network architecture
for decision-making. The evidence for decision 1 is applied via the λ1
inputs, and for decision 2 via the λ2 inputs. The synaptic weights wij
have been associatively modified during training in the presence of λ1
and at a different time of λ2. When λ1 and λ2 are applied, each
attractor competes through the inhibitory interneurons (not shown), until
one wins the competition, and the network falls into one of the high
firing rate attractors that represents the decision. The noise in the
network caused by the random spiking of the neurons means that on
some trials, for given inputs, the neurons in the decision 1 (D1)
attractor are more likely to win, and on other trials the neurons in the
decision 2 (D2) attractor are more likely to win. This makes the
decision-making probabilistic, for, as shown in (C), the noise influences
when the system will jump out of the spontaneous firing stable (low
energy) state S, and whether it jumps into the high firing state for
decision 1 (D1) or decision 2 (D2). (B) The architecture of the
integrate-and-fire network used to model decision-making (see text).
(C) A multistable “effective energy landscape” for decision-making with
stable states shown as low “potential” basins. Even when the
inputs are being applied to the network, the spontaneous firing rate
state is stable, and noise provokes transitions into the high firing rate
decision attractor state D1 or D2 [see Rolls and Deco (2010)].
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in any way was related to which attractor, D1 or D2, won on
a particular trial.
We showed that in this neurally plausible integrate-and-fire
attractor-based model of decision-making (Figure 1), the noise
generated by the randomness in the spiking times of neurons can
be used to predict a decision for 0.5 s or more before the decision
cues are applied (Figure 2). The ongoing noise at the time the
decision cues are applied influences which decision will be taken.
It is possible to predict on a single trial to more than 68% cor-
rect which of two decisions will be taken (Rolls and Deco, 2011).
The prediction is made from the spontaneous firing before the
decision cues are applied in the two populations of neurons that
represent the decisions. Thus, decisions can be partly predicted
even before the decision cues are applied, due to noise in the
decision-making process.
This analysis has interesting implications for decision-making
and free will, for it shows that random neuronal firing times can
influence a decision before the evidence for the decision has been
provided (Rolls and Deco, 2010, 2011).
MULTIPLE ROUTES TO ACTION
Much perception and action can be performed relatively auto-
matically, without apparent conscious intervention. An example
sometimes given is driving a car. Another example is the iden-
tification of a visual stimulus that can occur without conscious
awareness, in for example, backward masking experiments (Rolls
et al., 1994b; Rolls, 2003, 2005a, 2007b, 2011). Another example is
much of the sensory processing and actions that involve the dorsal
stream of visual processing to the parietal cortex, such as post-
ing a letter through a box at the correct orientation even when
one may not be aware of what the object is (Milner and Goodale,
1995; Goodale, 2004; Milner, 2008). Another example is blind-
sight, in which humans with damage to the visual cortex may be
able to point to objects even when they are not aware of seeing
an object (Weiskrantz, 1997, 1998). Similar evidence applies to
emotions, some of the processing for which can occur without
conscious awareness (De Gelder et al., 1999; Phelps and LeDoux,
2005; Rolls, 2005b, 2008a,b; LeDoux, 2008; Brooks et al., 2012;
Prabhakaran andGray, 2012). Further, there is evidence that split-
brain patients may not be aware of actions being performed by
the “non-dominant” hemisphere (Gazzaniga and LeDoux, 1978;
Gazzaniga, 1988, 1995; Cooney and Gazzaniga, 2003). Further
evidence consistent withmultiple including non-conscious routes
to action is that patients with focal brain damage, for example
to the prefrontal cortex, may perform actions, yet comment ver-
bally that they should not be performing those actions (Rolls
et al., 1994a; Rolls, 1999, 2005b; Hornak et al., 2003, 2004). The
actions, which appear to be performed implicitly, with surprise
expressed later by the explicit system, include making behavioral
responses to a no-longer rewarded visual stimulus in a visual dis-
crimination reversal (Rolls et al., 1994a; Hornak et al., 2004). In
both these types of patient, confabulation may occur, in that a
verbal account of why the action was performed may be given,
and this may not be related at all to the environmental event
that actually triggered the action (Gazzaniga and LeDoux, 1978;
Gazzaniga, 1988, 1995; Rolls et al., 1994a; Rolls, 2005b; LeDoux,
2008).
This evidence suggests that there are multiple routes to action,
only some of which involve conscious processing (Rolls, 2005b,
2008a, 2011, 2013).
The first route is via the brain systems that have been present
in non-human primates such as monkeys, and to some extent
in other mammals, for millions of years. These systems include
the amygdala and, particularly well-developed in primates, the
orbitofrontal cortex. These systems control behavior in relation
to previous associations of stimuli with reinforcement. The com-
putation which controls the action thus involves assessment of
the reinforcement-related value of a stimulus. The representa-
tion of the goal and reinforcement outcome provided by the
orbitofrontal cortex, and then action-outcome learning in the
cingulate cortex, controls behavior in the early stages of learn-
ing, and after much training habits involving stimulus-response
associations are set up in the basal ganglia (Rolls, 2005b, 2013;
Grabenhorst and Rolls, 2011; Rushworth et al., 2011).
The second route in humans involves a computation with
many “if . . . then” statements, to implement a plan to obtain a
reward. In this case, the reward may actually be deferred as part
of the plan, which might involve working first to obtain one
reward, and only then to work for a second more highly val-
ued reward, if this was thought to be overall an optimal strategy
in terms of resource usage (e.g., time). In this case, syntax is
required, because the many symbols (e.g., names of people) that
are part of the plan must be correctly linked or bound. Such
linking might be of the form: “if A does this, then B is likely to
do this, and this will cause C to do this. . .” The requirement of
syntax for this type of planning implies that an output to lan-
guage systems in the brain is required for this type of planning
(see Figure 3). Thus, the explicit language system in humans may
allow working for deferred rewards by enabling use of a one-off,
individual, plan appropriate for each situation. Another building
block for such planning operations in the brain may be the type
of short term memory in which the prefrontal cortex is involved.
This short term memory may be for example, in non-human
primates of where in space a response has just been made. A
development of this type of short term response memory system
in humans to enable multiple short term memories to be held
in place correctly, preferably with the temporal order of the dif-
ferent items in the short term memory coded correctly, may be
another building block for the multiple step “if. . . then” type of
computation in order to form a multiple step plan. Such short
term memories are implemented in the (dorsolateral and inferior
convexity) prefrontal cortex of non-human primates and humans
(Goldman-Rakic, 1996; Petrides, 1996; Rolls, 2008b), and may be
part of the reason why prefrontal cortex damage impairs planning
(Shallice and Burgess, 1996).
Of these two routes (see Figure 3), it is the second that I
have suggested above is related to consciousness (Rolls, 2004,
2007a,b, 2011, 2012, 2013). The hypothesis is that conscious-
ness is the state which arises by virtue of having the ability to
think about one’s own thoughts, which has the adaptive value
of enabling one to correct long multi-step syntactic plans. This
latter system is thus the one in which explicit, declarative, pro-
cessing occurs. Processing in this system is frequently associated
with reason and rationality, in that many of the consequences of
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Prediction of a decision before the evidence is applied. In this
integrate-and-fire simulation of decision-making, the decision cues were
turned on at t = 2 s, with I = 0 (i.e., the difference between the decision
variables λ1 and λ2 was 0). The firing rate averaged over approximately 650
winning vs. losing trials for the attractor shows that the firing rate when the
attractor will win is on average higher than that for when the attractor will
lose at a time that starts in this case at 300ms before the decision cues are
applied. (At t = 2 s with I = 0 the input firing rate on each of the 800
external input synapses onto every neuron of both of the selective attractor
populations is increased from 3.00 to 3.04 spikes/s, as described in the text).
The error bars show the standard deviation of the firing rate calculated
across trials for the 50ms bins to indicate the noisy operation of this
decision-making system. The large standard deviations in the period after the
decision cues are applied at 2 s reflect the different decision times of the
network on different trials. (B) As (A), but with an expanded firing rate axis so
that the difference in the firing rates of the pool that will win and of the pool
that will lose can be illustrated. (C) The prediction accuracy of which pool will
win from 100ms periods of the firing of the two pools at different times
before the decision cues are applied at t = 2 s. The network size was 500
neurons, with 400 excitatory neurons, 400 excitatory recurrent collateral
synaptic connections on each neuron, and 40 neurons in each of the two
decision pools. (D) Example from a single trial of the firing rates of the four
populations of neurons for a correct decision (for which I = 16). From the
top right the plot order is: D1 is the firing rate of the correct and winning
attractor D1. Inh is the inhibitory population that uses GABA as a transmitter.
NSp is the non-specific population of neurons (see Figure 1). D2 is the firing
rate of the correctly losing attractor D2. (E). Rastergrams for the same trial
shown in d to illustrate the probabilistic spiking of each neuron. Ten neurons
from each of the four pools of neurons are shown. Each vertical line is the
spike from a neuron [After Rolls and Deco (2011)].
possible actions can be taken into account. I draw a parallel with
neural networks: there is a “credit assignment” problem in such
multi-step syntactic plans, in that if the whole plan fails, how
does the system assign credit or blame to particular steps of the
plan? [In multilayer neural networks, the credit assignment prob-
lem is that if errors are being specified at the output layer, the
problem arises about how to propagate back the error to ear-
lier, hidden, layers of the network to assign credit or blame to
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FIGURE 3 | Dual routes to the initiation of action in response to
rewarding and punishing stimuli. The inputs from different sensory
systems to brain structures such as the orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala
allow these brain structures to evaluate the reward- or punishment-related
value of incoming stimuli, or of remembered stimuli. The different sensory
inputs enable evaluations within the orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala
based mainly on the primary (unlearned) reinforcement value for taste,
touch and olfactory stimuli, and on the secondary (learned) reinforcement
value for visual and auditory stimuli. In the case of vision, the “association
cortex” which outputs representations of objects to the amygdala and
orbitofrontal cortex is the inferior temporal visual cortex. One route for the
outputs from these evaluative brain structures is via projections directly to
structures such as the basal ganglia (including the striatum and ventral
striatum) to enable implicit, direct behavioral responses based on the
reward or punishment-related evaluation of the stimuli to be made. The
second route is via the language systems of the brain, which allow explicit
decisions involving multi-step syntactic planning to be implemented. [After
Rolls (2005b)].
individual synaptic connections; see Rumelhart et al. (1986); Rolls
and Deco (2002) and Rolls (2008b)]. The suggestion is that this
is the function of higher order thoughts and is why systems with
higher order thoughts evolved. The suggestion I then make is that
if a system were doing this type of processing (thinking about its
own thoughts), it would then be very plausible that it should feel
like something to be doing this. I even suggest to the reader that it
is not plausible to suggest that it would not feel like anything to a
system if it were doing this.
CONSCIOUS REPORTS OF ACTIONS INITIATED BY THE
AUTOMATIC vs. RATIONAL SYSTEMS
One question that has been discussed is whether there is a causal
role for consciousness [e.g., Armstrong and Malcolm (1984)].
The position to which the above arguments lead is that indeed
conscious processing does have a causal role in the elicitation of
behavior, but only under the set of circumstances when higher
order thoughts play a role in correcting or influencing lower order
thoughts. The sense in which the consciousness is causal is then
it is suggested, that the higher order thought is causally involved
in correcting the lower order thought; and that it is a property
of the higher order thought system that it feels like something
when it is operating. As we have seen, some behavioral responses
can be elicited when there is not this type of reflective control of
lower order processing, nor indeed any contribution of language
(see further, Rolls, 2003, 2005a, 2011, 2012, 2013 for relations
between implicit and explicit processing). There are many brain
processing routes to output regions, and only one of these involves
conscious, verbally represented processing which can later be
recalled (see Figure 3).
I suggest that these concepts may help us to understand what
is happening in experiments of the type described by Libet and
many others (Libet, 2002) in which consciousness appears to fol-
lowwith ameasurable latency the time when a decision was taken.
This is what I predict, if the decision is being made by an implicit
perhaps reward/emotion or habit-related process, for then the
conscious processor confabulates an account of or commentary
on the decision, so that inevitably the conscious account follows
the decision. On the other hand, I predict that if the rational
(multistep, reasoning) route is involved in taking the decision, as
it might be during planning, or a multistep task such as mental
arithmetic, then the conscious report of when the decision was
taken, and behavioral or other objective evidence on when the
decision was taken, would correspond much more. Under those
circumstances, the brain processing taking the decision would
be closely related to consciousness, and it would not be a case
of just confabulating or reporting on a decision taken by an
implicit processor. It would be of interest to test this hypothesis
in a version of Libet’s task (Libet, 2002) in which reasoning was
required.
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Further development of the present proposal, and how it deals
with some issues that arise when considering theories of the
phenomenal aspects of consciousness, are provided elsewhere
(Rolls, 2011).
SELECTION BETWEEN CONSCIOUS vs. UNCONSCIOUS
DECISION-MAKING MECHANISMS
The question then arises of how decisions are made in animals
such as humans that have both the implicit, direct reward-based,
and the explicit, rational, planning systems (see Figure 3) (Rolls,
2008b). One particular situation in which the first, implicit, sys-
tem may be especially important is when rapid reactions to
stimuli with reward or punishment value must be made, for then
the direct connections from structures such as the orbitofrontal
cortex to the basal ganglia may allow rapid actions (Rolls, 2005b).
Another is when there may be too many factors to be taken into
account easily by the explicit, rational, planning, system, when
the implicit system may be used to guide action. In contrast,
when the implicit system continually makes errors, it would then
be beneficial for the organism to switch from automatic, direct,
action (based on obtaining what the orbitofrontal cortex system
decodes as being the most positively reinforcing choice currently
available), to the explicit conscious control systemwhich can eval-
uate with its long-term planning algorithms what action should
be performed next. Indeed, it would be adaptive for the explicit
system to regularly be assessing performance by the more auto-
matic system, and to switch itself in to control behavior quite
frequently, as otherwise the adaptive value of having the explicit
system would be less than optimal.
It may be expected that there is often a conflict between these
systems, in that the first, implicit, system is able to guide behav-
ior particularly to obtain the greatest immediate reinforcement,
guided by genes that specify the goals, i.e., the rewards and pun-
ishers. In this case, we can describe our goal behavior as being
guided by selfish genes. In contrast, the reasoning or explicit sys-
tem can potentially enable immediate rewards to be deferred, and
longer-term, multi-step, plans to be formed, which may be in the
interests of the individual, the phenotype. I have described this
as making choices based on selfish genes vs. selfish phenotypes
(or selfish phenes).
Now what keeps the decision-making between the “Selfish
Genes” and the “Selfish Phenes” more or less under control and
in balance? If the second, rational, system chose too often for
the interests of the “Selfish Phene,” the genes in that phenotype
would not survive over generations. Having these two systems in
the same individual will only be stable if their potency is approxi-
mately equal, so that sometimes decisions are made with the first
route, and sometimes with the second route (Rolls, 2011). If the
two types of decision-making, then, compete with approximately
equal potency, and sometimes one is chosen, and sometimes the
other, then this is exactly the scenario in which stochastic pro-
cesses in the decision-making mechanism are likely to play an
important role in the decision that is taken. The same decision,
even with the same evidence, may not be taken each time a
decision is made, because of noise in the system.
The system itself may have some properties that help to keep
the system operating well. One is that if the second, rational,
system tends to dominate the decision-making too much, the
first, gene-based emotional system might fight back over genera-
tions of selection, and enhance the magnitude of the reward value
specified by the genes, so that emotions might actually become
stronger as a consequence of them having to compete in the inter-
ests of the selfish genes with the rational decision-making process
(Rolls, 2011, 2012).
Another property of the system may be that sometimes the
rational system cannot gain all the evidence that would be needed
to make a rational choice. Under these circumstances the ratio-
nal system might fail to make a clear decision, and under these
circumstances, basing a decision on the gene-specified emotions
is an alternative. Indeed, Damasio (1994) argued that under cir-
cumstances such as this, emotions might take an important role
in decision-making. In this respect, I agree with him, basing my
reasons on the arguments above. He called the emotional feel-
ings gut feelings, and, in contrast to me, hypothesized that actual
feedback from the gut was involved. His argument seemed to
be that if the decision was too complicated for the rational sys-
tem, then send outputs to the viscera, and whatever is sensed
by what they send back could be used in the decision-making,
and would account for the conscious feelings of the emotional
states. My reading of the evidence is that the feedback from the
periphery is not necessary for the emotional decision-making,
or for the feelings, nor would it be computationally efficient
to put the viscera in the loop given that the information starts
from the brain, but that is a matter considered elsewhere (Rolls,
2005b).
Another property of the system is that the interests of the
second, rational, system, although involving a different form of
computation, should not be too far from those of the gene-
defined emotional system, for the arrangement to be stable in
evolution by natural selection. One way that this could be facil-
itated would be if the gene-based goals felt pleasant or unpleasant
in the rational system, and in this way contributed to the oper-
ation of the second, rational, system. This is something that I
propose is the case (Rolls, 2012).
MECHANISMS FOR DECISION-MAKING BETWEEN THE
IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT SYSTEMS
Decision-making as implemented in neural networks in the
brain is now becoming understood, and is referred to in section
“Prediction of decisions from neural activity”. As shown there,
two attractor states, each one corresponding to a decision, com-
pete in an attractor single network with the evidence for each of
the decisions acting as biases to each of the attractor states. The
non-linear dynamics, and the way in which noise due to the ran-
dom spiking of neurons makes the decision-making probabilistic,
makes this a biologically plausible model of decision-making
consistent with much neurophysiological and fMRI data (Wang,
2002; Deco and Rolls, 2006; Deco et al., 2009; Rolls and Deco,
2010). I propose that the same neuronal attractor network mech-
anism is used in many different decision-making systems in the
brain, each present toward the later stages of each hierarchical
processing cortical pathway in the cerebral cortex, and each per-
forming categorization of the inputs received (Rolls, 2008b, 2013;
Rolls and Deco, 2010; Deco et al., 2012).
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I propose (Rolls, 2005b, 2008b) that this model applies
to taking decisions between the implicit (unconscious) and
explicit (conscious) systems in emotional decision-making, where
the two different systems could provide the biasing inputs
λ1 and λ2 to the model. An implication is that noise will
influence with probabilistic outcomes which system takes a
decision.
When decisions are taken, sometimes confabulation may
occur, in that a verbal account of why the action was performed
may be given, and this may not be related at all to the envi-
ronmental event that actually triggered the action (Gazzaniga
and LeDoux, 1978; Gazzaniga, 1988, 1995; Rolls, 2005b; LeDoux,
2008). It is accordingly possible that sometimes in normal
humans when actions are initiated as a result of processing in
a specialized brain region such as those involved in some types
of rewarded behavior, the language system may subsequently
elaborate a coherent account of why that action was performed
(i.e., confabulate). This would be consistent with a general view
of brain evolution in which, as areas of the cortex evolve, they
are laid on top of existing circuitry connecting inputs to outputs,
and in which each level in this hierarchy of separate input-output
pathways may control behavior according to the specialized func-
tion it can perform.
FREE WILL AND PROBABILISTIC DECISION-MAKING
BY ATTRACTOR NETWORKS IN THE BRAIN
These thoughts raise the issue of free will in decision-making.
First, we can note that in so far as the brain operates with
some degree of randomness due to the statistical fluctuations
produced by the random spiking times of neurons, brain func-
tion is to some extent non-deterministic, as defined in terms
of these statistical fluctuations. That is, the behavior of the sys-
tem, and of the individual, can vary from trial to trial based
on these statistical fluctuations, in ways that are described in
more detail elsewhere (Rolls and Deco, 2010). [Philosophers may
wish to argue about different senses of the term deterministic,
but is it being used here in a precise, scientific, and quan-
titative way, which has been clearly defined (Rolls and Deco,
2010)].
Second, do we have free will when both the implicit and the
explicit systems have made the choice? Free will would in Rolls’
view (2005b, 2008a,b, 2011, 2012) involve the use of language
to check many moves ahead on a number of possible series of
actions and their outcomes, and then with this information to
make a choice from the likely outcomes of different possible
series of actions. If in contrast choices were made only on the
basis of the reinforcement value of immediately available stim-
uli, without the arbitrary syntactic symbol manipulation made
possible by language, then the choice strategy would be much
more limited, and we might not want to use the term free will,
as all the consequences of those actions would not have been
computed. It is suggested that when this type of reflective, con-
scious, information processing is occurring and leading to action,
the system performing this processing and producing the action
would have to believe that it could cause the action, for other-
wise inconsistencies would arise, and the system might no longer
try to initiate action. This belief held by the system may partly
underlie the feeling of free will. At other times, when other brain
modules are initiating actions (in the implicit systems), the con-
scious processor (the explicit system)may confabulate and believe
that it caused the action, or at least give an account (possi-
bly wrong) of why the action was initiated. The fact that the
conscious processor may have the belief even in these circum-
stances that it initiated the action may arise as a property of
it being inconsistent for a system that can take overall control
using conscious verbal processing to believe that it was overrid-
den by another system. This may be the reason why confabulation
occurs.
The interesting view we are led to is thus that when probabilis-
tic choices influenced by stochastic dynamics are made between
the implicit and explicit systems, we may not be aware of which
system made the choice. Further, when the stochastic noise has
made us choose with the implicit system, we may confabulate and
say that we made the choice of our own free will, and provide a
guess at why the decision was taken. In this scenario, the stochas-
tic dynamics of the brain plays a role even in how we understand
free will (Rolls and Deco, 2010; Rolls, 2011, 2012).
THE PRECUNEUS, THE SENSE OF SELF AND AGENCY,
AND ITS DISTURBANCE IN SCHIZOPHRENIA
Further light on the different brain systems involved in differ-
ent aspects of decision-making and willed action (Rolls, 2013) is
provided by schizophrenic patients in which the sense of agency
and willed action is disturbed (Pu et al., 2013). We have found
using connectivity analyzes on resting state fMRI measurements
that the largest alteration in schizophrenic patients vs. controls in
the functional connectivity (measured by the correlation between
the activations in different brain regions) was a weakened cou-
pling between the posterior cingulate gyrus and precuneus (Pu
et al., 2013). The magnitude of the decrease in this coupling was
found to be positively correlated with the disturbance in voli-
tion, that is in the willful initiation, sustenance, and control of
thoughts, behavior, movements, and speech, in subsequent corre-
lation analyzes [This is G13 in the PANSS (positive and negative
syndrome scale for schizophrenia) Kay et al., 1987]. Further, mor-
phometric analysis identified reduced gray matter volume in the
precuneus. The disturbance in the sense of will, self, and agency,
prominent symptoms of schizophrenia, may thus be related to
the reduced functioning of the precuneus and posterior cingulate
cortex (Pu et al., 2013).
These findings are of interest, for the precuneus has been
described (Cavanna and Trimble, 2006) as being involved in
“visuo-spatial imagery, episodic memory retrieval (which essen-
tially always has a spatial component Rolls, 2010), and in
self-processing operations namely first-person perspective tak-
ing and an experience of agency.” Further, the precuneus is
described as being involved in self-consciousness, and as hav-
ing high activity when humans are engaged in self-related
mental representations during rest. The activity in the pre-
cuneus and posterior cingulate areas decreases during engage-
ment in non-self-referential goal-directed actions, that is when
actions are performed under the control of external stimuli,
and are not self-generated (Cavanna and Trimble, 2006). The
precuneus and posterior cingulate cortex are thus part of the
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default-mode network (Raichle et al., 2001), which is active when
subjects are not initiating actions to external stimuli.
These findings, and previous research on the precuneus and
its connected areas (Cavanna and Trimble, 2006), thus lead me
to propose that the reduced sense of agency and that the self
is in control, which is a key symptom of schizophrenia (Sass
and Parnas, 2003), is related to the reduction in the coupling
between the precuneus and the posterior cingulate cortex, identi-
fied in both patient groups in the investigation (Pu et al., 2013).
Consistent with this proposal, the intrinsic activity of the brain
during the resting-state is thought to reflect self-referential pro-
cessing, which is reduced in schizophrenia, and resting state
measurements in schizophrenic patients with fMRI and positron
emission tomography showed hypoactivation compared to con-
trols in the precuneus, posterior cingulate cortex, and left hip-
pocampus (Kuhn and Gallinat, 2011). Further, the concept that
misattributions of agency in schizophrenia are due to impaired
predictions concerning the sensory consequences of one’s own
actions (Synofzik et al., 2010) also fits the view that the precuneus
and posterior cingulate cortex process self-generated visuo-spatial
information (Cavanna and Trimble, 2006).
Thus, the precuneus and other parts of the default mode net-
work appear to be involved in self-initiated action in contrast
to externally triggered action, and weakened functional connec-
tivity in this system appears to be related to disturbances in
volition, the sense of self, and agency that are found in for example
schizophrenia (Pu et al., 2013).
CONCLUSIONS
The evidence reviewed here suggests that there are multiple
decision-making systems in the brain, and multiple routes to
action, only some of which involve self-initiated in contrast to
externally triggered action, and only some of which involve con-
scious processing (Rolls, 2005b, 2008a, 2011, 2013). The evidence
has important implications for understanding the initiation of
willed actions, and our reports about why actions are performed,
and about when they are initiated by decision-making processes.
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